

Series I  
Correspondence,  
1932-1973

Box 3, Folder 29

June 27, 1950 -  
October 4, 1950

0819

27 June 1959

*Mr. R. Bates*  
Dear Captain Crichton:

Thank you very much for your friendly interest in assisting the War College to produce the Battle of Savo Island. It is a great help to know that the master copy is in safe hands.

Since bringing the book to you for publishing I have found several mistakes which I hope you will be able to correct for me. Will you have pages 130, 136, 206 and 360 in the master copy replaced with the enclosed pages? That will, so far as I know, correct any glaring errors.

Please tell Captain Webb that I hope that I can help him out in his ideas for improving professional judgement in command. It is highly important.

Thanks again for everything.

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES  
Commodore, USN(Ret)

Captain C. H. Crichton, USN  
Room 2635  
Bureau of Naval Personnel  
Arlington Annex  
Navy Department  
Washington 25, D.C.

0820

29 June, 1950

Dear Burrowes:-

Thank you for your letter of the 26th instant. I am awfully pleased that your translation problem is, for the moment, over and I am delighted that the translator is ready to start work.

I am enclosing a copy of a confidential letter which we sent to O.N.I. relative to the type and source of the information desired for the Battle for Leyte Gulf. This will give an idea to the translator of our problem.

What I desire first is the background at the time of the battle. This includes:

- (a) Japanese Command Relations.
- (b) Information available to Japanese commanders.
- (c) Japanese Land and Tender-Based aircraft. This includes numbers of planes and where based.
- (d) Japanese Search and Reconnaissance. This covers both daily and special searches.
- (e) Japanese Disposition Naval Forces at the time of the Allied Landing at Leyte, 20 October, 1944.
- (f) Japanese Tasks assigned.
- (g) Japanese General concept. This would probably be "SHO One".

To obtain the above information, it will be necessary to go into a number of sources. Some of these are included in enclosure (2) to the confidential letter referred to in paragraph two above.

I think that it would be well for your translator to report here after he is squared away down there so that I may discuss with him the objectives of the War College books. I will then cause him to read my previous

0821

volumes including Savo Island now in process of publication, and will endeavor to train his mind to the problem from the viewpoint of the writer. I did this somewhat with the W.D.C. (Washington Document Center) and it was effective.

I received my orders this morning for indefinite duty here.

Take care of yourself. Thanks for everything!

As ever,

Yours sincerely,

R. W. BATES

Office of the Chief  
of Naval Operations  
Op-345  
Rm 4C539  
National Defense Bldg.

0822

3 July 1950

Mr. Hanousek  
Audio Productions  
630 Ninth Avenue  
New York 19, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Hanousek:

I am in receipt of your letter and of Mr. Southgate's relative to the chart which you sent me.

The method of labelling and presenting meets with my approval with the exception that the names of the military forces and the names of the islands should be of different size and color. Perhaps the names Wake, Midway, Aleutians, Pearl Harbor, Japan could be larger and heavier than the names of the various military forces. I don't care how you do this so long as there is a definite difference.

Both CTF 8.1 and CTF 8.3 were at Kodiak.

The searches made by Allied planes from Otter Point Cold Bay and Sand Point began at 1900. This was 7 P.M. Those from Kodiak began at 1800. All searches from Umnak, Cold Bay and Sand Point were to a radius of 400 miles - those from Kodiak were to 700 miles. These searches are plainly shown on Diagram B and require no replotting.

Cold Bay conducted a daylight search of sectors 1, 2 and 3 on June 3rd but the times of the searches are not known. Other bases probably did the same but the information is very sketchy. Perhaps it would be just as well not to show any specific searches at 0900, June 3rd.

Best of luck,

R. W. Bates,  
Commodore, U.S.N.

0823

July 6, 1950

Dear Roger:-

This has to be short as I am going on leave to California. However, I wish to comment to you on several items.

(a) Thankyou for your efforts in Japan. You were roughly treated for which there is no excuse. I apologize for the Army.

(b) We have fixed things up temporarily by engaging a translator in the U.S. I worked this out with ONI when I was in Washington a few weeks ago. They thought that I wished a Japanese only.

(c) Will you please return the slides on Surigao Strait which you borrowed for Captain Morrison. They are "confidential"; were prepared for my lecture at the National War College, and therefore should not be copied, and are required in the War College files. I will try to keep you out of the hoosegow if you will hurry their return. You promised to return them immediately.

Outside of the above, things are fine here and we are starting on Leyte Gulf.

Best regards as always,

Very sincerely,

R.W. Bates

Mr. Roger Pineau  
Office of Naval Records & History  
Room 2507  
Washington 25, D.C.

0824

9 August 1950

Dear Southgate:-

The schedule proposed in your letter of August 7th is satisfactory to me and I will be there. Thank you for arranging the matter.

I am somewhat surprised at the arrangements for Audio's "Midway", however. I have only seen their work once and, as you know, I was not impressed. I had hoped that "Midway" would be shown at the War College first so that we here might recommend changes as we did with Film Graphics "Coral Sea". If the showing of "Midway" that I saw in New York is any criterion, I am afraid that the showing in Washington at the N.P.C. will not meet with my approval, at least for the last half. As you know, I have only seen about one-half of this film. Some of my objections appear to have been overcome on the first part but what about the last part? The best critics of these films should be the staff of the War College who are working on "Command" problems. I welcome, of course, McGoldrick's comments as he is very much on the ball but who else will comment? I do not know.

I hope that I am wrong about "Midway". I shall try to observe it with an open mind but whether I shall succeed in keeping my mind open is another question. Where movies are made by people who are not competent in military matters - no one expects them to be - it would seem as if it would be wise to call in the technical adviser. I have scarcely been called in at all, and yet, I am the technical adviser. As I understand it, no one else is authorized to make any decisions whatsoever.

Outside of that, all is well.

Best to you

Very Sincerely Yours,

R. W. BATES

Mr. Howard Southgate  
Naval Photographic Center  
Anacostia 20, D.C.

0825

14 August 1950

Dear Lacy:-

I am in receipt of your letter of 20 July wherein you make a query as to the book "Sound Military Decision".

For your information, S.M.D. is no longer used in the College as a basic training manual - instead, it is used for reference only. The book now employed is the Planning Manual.

As S.M.D. and the Planning Manual are Restricted, it is suggested that you write to the President of the War College for a release of one or both of these publications.

It is nice to hear from you. We who went through the war together have many pleasant memories of one another, and, in particular, those of us who worked at the War College have many such memories.

Thanks for your kind remembrances of me. I liked it.

Very sincerely yours

R. W. BATES

Mr. Harold G. Lacy  
Devon, Penn.

0826



21 August 1950

Dear Captain Kittredge:-

I cannot thank you too much for your help to me during my recent trip to Washington. You are a very friendly and helpful fellow and I am grateful.

I think that Miss Perkins understands the problem thoroughly and will be a great help to me. She seems extremely capable and understanding so I feel lucky. I do hope that her prospective marriage won't throw her off the beam but if it does, I cannot blame her. Perhaps as a bachelor, I may privately envy her! Who knows?

If you see General Ward, please give him my best regards. If you will send me his name and address, I will send him a letter of appreciation.

Many thanks to you. If I can help you here, a letter to that effect will not fall on barren ground.

Sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES

Captain Tracy B. Kittredge, USNR  
Room 2D 883  
Pentagon Building  
Washington, D.C.

0827

23 August 1950

Dear Lynde:-

It is always a great satisfaction to see you and Lillian and to observe once again the completeness with which you both enter into the responsibilities connected with your high office. I have always been impressed with the manner in which you keep your business desk cleared. That is a plain indication of administrative ability of no low order.

There were several points which I had wished to discuss with you prior to my departure from Washington, but I didn't want to do so until I had spoken to "Frog" Low. I spoke to Admiral Low on Friday afternoon and he advised me to speak to you but, when I attempted to do so, I discovered that you and Forrest were busy discussing the Tokyo trip and I thought it would be unwise to discuss the matter with you at the time. I therefore returned to Newport.

The principal matter that I wished to discuss with you is the Electronics Generator and Display System which we hope to install here at the War College. As you know, the Maneuver (Game) Board is too slow to obtain even good results in view of radar and in view of the increasing speeds of modern weapons, particularly those of aircraft and guided missiles. Mindful of this, the War College recommended some few years ago that the above mentioned Electronics Generator and Display System, which I prefer to call the Electronics Command Trainer, be built in connection with the War College. This Command Trainer would be equipped with many electronic devices. These devices would represent the bridges of the ships and the plotting rooms and the equipment therein and would thus permit command problems to be solved exactly as if the commanders were at sea.

This Electronics Command Trainer would also be available to Task Force and Task Group Commanders at sea as well as to such Commanders who had received orders to sea. It could be used by them for training their staffs in coordinated and cooperative effort. When so used, it would enable the Commander to determine which subordinates thought correctly and quickly in the various situations which would be set up in the Electronics Command Trainer and which did not.

0828

The War College has been endeavoring to obtain this Electronics Command Trainer for some time and has enjoyed the happy experience of discovering that it is considered highly important by anyone who is sent here to discuss it. Admiral J. E. Maher has long been a supporter of it. However, it is losing ground now, as other matters appear to take priority. Admiral Low seems to be fully sold on this Electronics Command Trainer and to appreciate its remarkable possibilities. He therefore told me to tell the War College to re-submit the project so that it might be given new and immediate attention in the light of the present world situation.

I feel sure that Admiral Low and yourself realize the necessity for determining what officers are able to make correct decisions quickly. Although this can often be accomplished at sea by fleet maneuvers, it is a difficult and expensive process. It is believed that this installation will enable such determination to be made fairly accurately and at limited expense once the first cost has been absorbed.

I also feel sure that you realize as prospective Fleet Commanders the necessity for providing means of training competent staffs for Fleet operations. I have every reason to believe that this may be accomplished reasonably well with this Electronics Command Trainer. In view of this, I personally feel that the installation is a must and should no longer be delayed.

Another matter that I wish to comment on in passing concerns September's Selection Board. As you probably know, the Naval War College has not promoted any of its staff or students to Rear Admiral for a long time - certainly not since 1942. This necessarily has had a most adverse effect on the position the War College occupies in the minds of the officers of the Fleet. This year three important officers from the War College Staff will be considered by the Board meeting next month. I certainly hope that, for the sake of the War College, to say nothing of the welfare of the Fleet, one or more of these officers will be lucky enough to be selected. I realize, of course, that the decision rests with the Selection Board alone and with no one else. That is as it should be. However, I shall certainly watch the results with an intense and prayerful interest.

The War College is submitting a letter requesting an increase in the officer allowance of from two to four officers for my "Special Project", ie the Analysis of the

0829

"Battle for Leyte Gulf". This would return my staff to the same number that Admiral Spruance considered necessary for both "The Coral Sea" and "Midway". My present staff of two including myself is inadequate for the proper functioning of my Section. The additional two officers are to be retired officers if possible, although active officers would be acceptable. I have spoken to both Vice-Admiral Roper and Rear-Admiral Watkins on this matter and they prefer the employment of retired officers, not only because of the world situation, but also because retired officers are relatively inexpensive. I hope that you and Sherman will view this request favorably as my section is becoming more and more of a "poor relation". I will explain this latter comment when I see you again.

I hope that Admiral Sherman comes back from his trip to Tokyo refreshed and well satisfied as to the Navy's performance in the Korean area.

It was fine to see you and Lillian. You are a swell pair!

As ever,

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES

Vice Admiral L. D. McCormick, USN  
Vice Chief of Naval Operations  
Room 4E628 Pentagon Bld.  
Washington, D.C.

0830

*Carroll  
File  
Rut*

24 August 1950

Mr. Lee Blair  
Film Graphics  
245 W 55th Street  
New York, N.Y.

Dear Blair:

Your movie was ably shown by Mr. Rubens in the Auditorium in the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. and, from all reports, was well received. It will be very valuable in the training of command. For this I give you thanks. There were certain items, however, which required modification but all of them were more or less knit-pick. These modifications were:

(a) In the Forward Title there should be included the substance of paragraph four (4) of the Forward of the basic book. I will work up something on this for you.

(b) The clarity of the opening words of Part II is poor. It sounds exactly as any record sounds when the needle is lowered just after the correct starting point so that the beginning words are chopped off.

(c) The introduction of the strength and weakness factors should be done more smoothly, and should point directly to the carrier battle coming up on May 8th. It should be a simple matter to point out that a carrier battle is about to occur and that the comparison of forces for this carrier battle is about as follows:

(d) The table of strength and weakness factors should be headed by an American Flag on the American side, and by a Japanese Flag on the Japanese side and not by any other device. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations disapproved the employment of aircraft wing insignia for these headings.

(e) The quality of the voice discussing the battle lessons is poor because it is not uniform. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations pointed out that it was important to present the battle lessons with a more or less uniform tone quality. He felt that certain of the lessons, which were minor, were given with such a loud voice as to appear to be of greater importance than the major battle lessons.

0831

(f) The battle lesson on Communications ie, battle lesson No. 19 should be deleted.

(g) There seems to be a picture of Yamamoto on the bridge of his flagship in Phase I which is correct, and a further picture of him in Phase III, or in the battle lessons, which is incorrect. Please delete the 2nd picture.

(h) There also seems to be a picture of two (2) officers in blue uniform in the latter part of the film. This should also be deleted as except for the picture showing the staff at Tokyo, the Japanese throughout the battle are shown in summer clothes.

It is my understanding that Mr. Southgate has already given you some other errors which he and Commander McGoldrick had collected after the showing.

I am a little sorry that the movie was shown before I had had a chance to look at the completed version but, even with its slight errors, it was highly successful.

Both Vice Admiral McCormick and Vice Admiral Low are fearful that there may be too much music in the completed film. I told them that the music would only be at the beginning and end with sound effects in between. Am I right? This seemed satisfactory to them.

With warmest personal regards and with congratulations on your success in this movie, I am

Sincerely yours

R. W. BATES

0832

25 September 1950

Mr. Howard Southgate  
Project Supervisor  
U.S. Naval Photographic Center  
Naval Air Station,  
Anacostia, D.C.

Dear Mr. Southgate:

I completed my work with Mr. Lee Blair on Sunday noon  
- we worked Sunday morning - and I then returned to Newport.

Mr. Blair and I found some errors and did some re-wording, and, as I had discovered in our Washington test that the high command viz Vice-Admirals McCormick and Low and Rear-Admiral Briscoe were especially interested in battle lessons, I cut out one which Briscoe did not like and added I think, three which had been overlooked.

I hope that you can make an arrangement with your "boss" so that Mr. Blair gets some increase in compensation for these changes. As I have said repeatedly, these movies are of a new type - we have been groping our way - and a firm specification is almost impossible. Should we be forced to such a thing, I am afraid the movie would be poor. You know the Coral Sea is not poor but met with high approval in its tentative state.

I am now sending you by separate mail (Reg. No. W-276) the completed script for Savo Island. You may find it too long. I am quite willing, therefore, after your own staff has made a rough picture board of it, to discuss with you any modifications in wording or in length. However, as these are command educational films of a particular type, perhaps a little overlength is unimportant.

Best to you.

Yours sincerely,

R. W. BATES

0833

25 September 1950

Captain G. C. Towner, USN  
Director Training Division  
Bureau of Naval Personnel  
Navy Department  
Washington, D.C.

Dear George:-

I was told this morning by Captain Crichton that you were Mr. Money-bags in Bupers. So here is what I am suggesting:

As you perhaps know, we are writing here the analytical studies of the Battles of the Coral Sea, Midway, Savo Island and Leyte Gulf. We have finished the first three. Two of them, the first two, have been in the Fleet for two years and have received great applause.

We have been having these studies Photo-offsetted at the G.P.O. as it was cheaper than printing for our purposes. It was planned at first to have them published in book form; that is, with cloth cover, printing instead of photo-offset etc. I rejected this because money was tight and I wanted to discover the errors in my works, if any, before they became final. To date, I have received so few critical comments and have received so much friendly comment that I think that both the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway are now ready to be put out in final form.

By doing this, we would only be doing what the Army and the Air Force are doing today. Notice their historical works! The Army publishes theirs through the G.P.O.; the Air Force through the University of Chicago Press.

We should print about 2500 copies, I guess.

Finally, best to you! I suppose an engineer is better qualified than most to handle training. It takes a trained mind, and where can one better develop one's mind in fundamental thinking than in engineering post-graduate work, followed by the War College.

As ever.

Yours sincerely

R. W. BATES

0834



27 September 1950

Dear Sam:

In reply to your letter of recent date, I wish to state that I am only just now starting the Battle for Leyte Gulf as I have been busy on other matters. I cannot say that I have made any conclusions concerning Coward's torpedo performance.

It was my opinion, when I worked up some data on Surigao Strait some three years ago - this was the same time that I made these plates - that Coward's squadron had done well. I won't know, probably until next summer, what actually occurred as, by that time, the Japanese translations of what occurred, and when, should be available to me. Perhaps there is helpful information in the War Diaries or in the Action Reports of the MOGAMI and the SHIGURE. Perhaps some reports were made by the survivors of the ships sunk at Surigao? We shall see!

I am sending you the plates you desire by separate cover. We have no way here of reproducing them - they were hand-painted for me by Lieut. Pollock, now retired. I am not guaranteeing their correctness but they are, I think, reasonably correct for general purposes.

I am happy to have you avail yourself of them but when you have finished with your lectures, I should appreciate your returning them. Thereafter, if and when you need them, I can send them to you.

The analytical study of the Leyte Gulf affair is going to take a long time - certainly several years and possibly more. I hope not, but as Savo took two years, Leyte cannot be expected to take less.

I'm sorry that I missed you when you were here, but I always seem to be going somewhere - generally on official business.

Your friend, Commander White, seems to be a pleasant fellow. We shall be glad to help him all we can.

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES

Captain S. E. Morison, USNR  
44 Brimmer St  
Boston, Mass.

0835

3 October 1950

Mr. Howard Southgate  
Project Supervisor  
U.S. Naval Photographic Center  
Naval Air Station  
Anacostia, D.C.

Dear Mr. Southgate:-

Audio Productions showed their Parts I and II of Midway Island and it was highly successful. However, some of the live film was of doubtful accuracy and will have to be checked. We cannot have TBDs represented by TBFs for example. Actually there is still too much live action.

The universal opinion of the observers was that whereas the picture is very "fine", it would have been "great" had more criticism of the various decisions been inserted. The observers all felt that in some places it was more of a narrative than an exposition on command. I explained that you had said that more criticism could not go in as the movie had originally been limited to 80 minutes. All hands agreed that it was not necessary or even wise to try to produce such a short movie - that it was more important to get into the movie the processes of command - even if it took much longer.

I note that Battle Lessons 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 11 are not included in the movie script. All hands agree and insist that they must be inserted in their proper place. So will you please advise Audio Productions that these necessary lessons are to be inserted in their entirety. Suppose it does take 20 minutes more - what of it!

I feel confident that if you will take up this matter with your Commanding Officer he will immediately agree with the War College. These are educational films not narratives - the narrative is solely employed so that the background of the lessons may be understood - and every final lesson must be in the completed movie. These battle lessons have all been approved

0836

by Admiral Spruance and have been condensed as much as possible.

Where is the attack made in early morning June 4th at about 0143 by four PBV planes armed with torpedoes shown in the movie? We could not discover it. It is shown and discussed on pages 79, 105 and 109.

It has also been suggested that somewhere in Part I we put in some of the background of the INTRODUCTION pages 1 and 2 of the basic book. We did this in the Savo Island book and it was excellent. What we should bring out here is the effect the Tokyo raid and the sighting of Halsey's Task Force on May 14th near Tulagi had on the Japanese plans. The Japanese overlooked the Allied capability of bringing these carriers back to Hawaii and thence to the Midway area.

In view of the fact that many observers thought that all criticisms were in the film, I plan to ask Audio Productions to insert the following in the FOREWORD:

THIS FILM IS NOT THE COMPLETE ANALYSIS CONTAINED IN NAVPERS 91067 AND DOES NOT REPLACE THAT STUDY. IT MERELY SUPPLEMENTS IT. OF NECESSITY, OWING TO TIME LIMITATIONS, MANY OF THE DETAILS OF THE BATTLE HAVE BEEN OMITTED. THROUGHOUT THE NARRATIVE MANY LESSONS DRAWN FROM THE ACTION ARE SHOWN BUT AGAIN, DUE TO TIME LIMITATIONS, NOT ALL OF THEM COULD BE INCLUDED. FOR THE COMPLETE ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE, REFERENCE MUST BE MADE TO THE BOOK.

Please advise me as to the name of your Commanding Officer, as I wish to write him a letter. I am seriously considering discussing the whole matter with Admirals Roper and Price. The High Command - Vice-Admirals McCormick and Low - and many Rear-Admirals want the battle lessons included in their entirety.

The Savo Island movie must contain everything possible even though the movie is longer than deemed best. All officers here say that where they are learning one hour more makes no difference.

Best to you,

R. W. BATES

0837

3 October 1950

Audio Productions  
630 Ninth Avenue  
New York 19, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Hanousek:

Your trip here yesterday was very successful and brought forth general praise. The only weakness of the film was the fact that some of the criticisms of command were missing. I hope that you will be able to work in the additional comments which you got here and in New York.

Meanwhile, I have written to Mr. Southgate and have suggested that he make arrangements to include in the movie:

(a) Some of the Introduction (pages 1 and 2). Here we should bring out the effect the Tokyo raid and the sighting of Halsey's task force on May 14th near Tulagi had on Japanese plans. The Japanese overlooked the Allied capability of bringing these carriers back to Hawaii and thence to the Midway area in time for the Midway action.

(b) The attack made by 4 PBVs armed with torpedoes discussed on pages 79, 105 and 109. We should also include the comment on 109: "This attack by the four patrol planes demonstrated for the first time the practicability of using long-range shore-based aircraft, radar equipped, to deliver unsupported night torpedo attacks or low altitude bombing attacks against ships."

(c) Some information about submarines. See pages 145, 146, 180, 181 with especial attention being paid to the GROUPER on page 146, and the NAUTILUS on page 145.

(d) All final battle lessons shown on pages 212 to 226 (incl.). I have told Mr. Southgate that the missing battle lessons 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 11 must be included and that very little, if any, reduction in their size will be approved by me.

With reference to the comments concerning the type of aircraft employed, your attention is invited to Appendix II of NavPers 91067. In the case of the ENTERPRISE Group (CVG-6), all

0838

squadrons were designated "6" (VF-6, VT-6, VS-6, and VB-6). Likewise, the HORNET was "8". In both groups the scouting squadron (VS) and the bombing squadron (VB) flew SBDs. You will note that there were no TBFs in the carriers. The only TBFs in the battle were the six which were based at Midway (third page of Appendix II). The picture of a TBF in the attack of VT-6 should therefore be changed to a TBD.

In the YORKTOWN Group as shown in Appendix II, the complements of VT-3 and VS-5 should be interchanged to show VT-3 with 13 TBDs and VS-5 with 18 SBD.

Thank you for appearing here. It did a lot of good and shows the necessity for having the technical advisor advise during the progress of a film. I am the technical advisor; not Mr. Southgate or anyone else in Washington or here. Please don't forget that! We could save time and money if you would consult me more often as no one but me understands what I am trying to accomplish.

I do not wish to be confronted with a "fait accompli".

The War College will want as much of the movie as possible for early November. I wish all of the recommended changes included in the November draft as far as you are able to do so.

Perhaps the November showing before the students can be your next trial run.

Once again, thanks for coming up. It was very helpful and everyone is pleased.

Very truly yours

R. W. BATES

0839

4 October 1950

Audio Productions  
630 Ninth Avenue  
New York 19, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Hanousek:

In line with our discussions on Monday, I desire that the following paragraph be inserted in the foreword of the film. I think that this will clear up the problem.

THIS FILM IS NOT THE COMPLETE ANALYSIS CONTAINED IN NAVPERS 91067 AND DOES NOT REPLACE THAT STUDY. IT MERELY SUPPLEMENTS IT. OF NECESSITY, OWING TO TIME LIMITATIONS, MANY OF THE DETAILS OF THE BATTLE HAVE BEEN OMITTED. THROUGHOUT THE NARRATIVE MANY LESSONS DRAWN FROM THE ACTION ARE SHOWN BUT AGAIN, DUE TO TIME LIMITATIONS, NOT ALL OF THEM COULD BE INCLUDED. FOR THE COMPLETE ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE, REFERENCE MUST BE MADE TO THE BOOK.

I have purposely left this out of my letter of October 3rd lest it be lost in the shuffle.

The World War II studies begin here at the War College on November 6th. In order to review your corrections before that time and in order to see your Part III, perhaps it would be well for me to come to New York.

R. W. BATES

0840